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Abstract  
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a significant movement toward global markets, 
especially the privatisation of the State-Owned Enterprises. Recently, after a more than 
three decades of excessive reliance on the public sector, Libya has pursued privatisation 
of its public sector. This paper explores the underlying forces of the economic reform, 
especially with respect to the privatisation of industrial sector, in Libya. It is found that 
privatisation has been pursued in Libya as result of its own policy plan, rarely after 
pressures from the international lending agencies. It has been embarked on with more 
pragmatic and less ideological base. 
1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a significant global movement away from the state 
ownership of production and services towards the private ownership and free enterprises 
(Gratton-Lavoie, 2000). One of the important aspects of this trend has been the sale of the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the private investors with the hope to improve the 
unsatisfactory performance of these firms. This process was called a privatisation and it 
was attributed to the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 (Megginson, 
Nash, & Randenborgh, 1994). The initial motivation for the privatisation is based on the 
comprehensive divestiture of the SOEs in the United Kingdom (UK). The successful sale 
of British Telecom in 1984 was an example to launch similar privatisation in many other 
developed countries such as France, Italy, German, and Japan (Megginson & Netter, 
2001). By the end-1980s, privatisation spread rapidly around the world, especially to the 
developing countries of South Asian, Latin America, African, and Middle East (Gratton-
Lavoie, 2000). Libya was not an exceptional; it has witnessed privatisation of small 
public firms in 1987 and trade liberalisation in 1992. However, most of the evidence 
suggests that the Libyan economy remains tightly controlled by the state and shows no 
real signs of reform (Vandewalle, 1996). In recent years, Libya started its transition to 
move from a planned to a market-based economic system. It is ahead with privatising its 
public sector, liberalising its economy, and applying for the membership of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) (IMF, 2006).  
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This research explores the underlying causes of the economic reform, especially a 
privatisation, in Libya. The argument relies on the claim that governments have different 
incentives to privatise their economy. They may privatise as result of ideological shifts 
hostile to the SOEs or as a pragmatic response to the poor performance of these firms. 
The governments may also privatise under pressures from the international lending 
agencies. The research addresses the following questions: When and how has the Libyan 
economy privatised? Is the Libya government privatising because it is an easy way to 
raise cash to finance budget deficits? Is it being forced into it by powerful international 
agencies? Or is it doing so because it is likely to improve the long-term performance of 
its economy?  
2. Literature Review  
To understand the movement from the state ownership towards a market oriented 
economy, especially the privatisation of SOEs, a brief review of the history of both 
privatisation and its precursor nationalisation is provided. Throughout the history, the 
SOEs are found in both developed and developing nations (Colavito, 1997). The SOEs 
are an amorphous group of companies covering most sectors of the economy, acquired 
under a variety of political ambitions and held together by a number of status and legal 
provision (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002). The depression, World War II, and the final breakup 
of colonial empires pushed government into a more active role, including ownership of 
production and services in much of the world. The government ownership grew in the 
developing world for slightly different reasons (Megginson & Netter, 2001). The primary 
economic motivation behind the SOEs was increased capital investment. Several real 
constraints hindered capital investment in developing economies in the years following 
the World War II, the most important of which was low domestic savings rates (Smith & 
Trebilcock, 2001). Meanwhile, many countries had no alternative to reliance on the state 
ownership because there was no local private sector or the local private sector was 
insufficiently developed (Nellis & Kikeri 1989). Another reason for the state ownership, 
often through nationalisation, was a historical resentment of the foreigners who owned 
many of the largest firms in these countries (Megginson & Netter, 2001). Meanwhile, 
many governments were influenced by the spread of socialist ideology following the 
World War II, which dictated that the state control the “commanding height” of its 
economy (Smith & Trebilcock, 2001).  
After 1980, undue and overgrown state intervention gave rise to cumulative financial 
deficit and foreign debt (Seock, 2005). Since then, privatisation has been promoted by 
economists as a key component of structural reform programs in both developed and 
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developing economies (Parker, 1999). Privatisation is a process which shifts the 
economic activities from the public to the private sector in an economy (Awadalla, 2003). 
It includes denationalisation (the sale of publicly owned assets), deregulation (the 
introduction of competition into statutory monopolies), and contracting out (the 
franchising to private firms of the production of the SOEs) (Kay & Thompson, 1986).  
The common argument for the private over the state ownership centres on the 
comparative economic efficiency of public and private sectors (Parker, 1999). In general, 
inefficiency is traced back to the ideological shifts hostile to the SOEs that started in the 
UK and the United States (US) (Colavito, 1997). Conservative governments are believed 
to be more prone to privatise the economy than socialist or Christian democratic 
government (Bortolotti, Fantini, & Siniscalco, 2003). The UK is an example of a country 
where supposed superior efficiency of private ownership was main driving force of the 
privatisation policy for conservative government of 1979 to 1997 (Parker, 1999). Another 
example is France where a right of centre government between 1986 and 1988 privatised 
large industrial, banking and financial trusts. This privatisation was brought to a halt by 
the election of socialist administration in 1988. The re-election of a right centre 
government in 1993 renewed the privatisation again (Parker, 1999). The ideological shift 
away from SOEs has for long been encouraged by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (Ramamurti, 1991). It is now widely reflected in the 
policy of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Colavito, 
1997). Based on these developments, the following proposition is offered:  
P.1: The government privatises its economy as result of ideological shift hostile to the 
SOEs. 
Privatisation has also been associated with two major economic pressures, namely fiscal 
and international pressures on the governments. In the 1980s, the governments of both 
rich and poor developing countries found themselves with large budget deficits. In the 
aftermath of the oil crisis and the debt crisis that followed it, governments found it 
difficult to squeeze money out of taxpayers and savers at home and from lenders abroad. 
This turned privatisation into a serious option for improving the short-term cash for 
governments (Ramamurti, 1991). For instance, in the late 1980s, the Hungarian 
government implemented privatisation program to reduce the deficit of state budget 
(Louzek, 2005). Therefore, the higher budget deficit can explain the timing of the 
privatisation revolution in the 1980s. Accordingly, the following proposition is offered: 
P.2: The government privatises its economy due to high budget deficit. 
A second economic pressure is applied by international lending agencies to which 
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developing countries came to finance their external debts. These agencies made their 
credit dependent upon the adoption of market reforms (Manzetti, 1994). The notable 
example is Jordan‟s privatisation program that was initiated in the late 1980s when the 
country, unable to service its $8 billion external debt in 1989, came under pressure to 
implement structural reform as part of its program with the international agencies. 
Similarly, the privatisation of 1991 in Egypt was part of the package of measures agreed 
between the IMF and the Egyptian government to access to fund (Kauffmann & Wegner, 
2007). The role of international agencies would then explain the shift in favour of 
privatisation in many developing countries. Thus, the following proposition is offered: 
P.3: The government privatises its economy due to the pressures from international 
lending agencies. 
The emphasis on the privatisation follows growing evidence that the SOEs have had poor 
economic performance and have not met their objectives (Colavito, 1997). This is based 
on the argument that the governments, over the years, have become disillusioned with the 
performance of SOEs and learned that the inefficiencies associated with state ownership 
were higher than expected. They seem to have grudgingly accepted this view after 
evidence revealed that a variety of solutions to the problem of managing the SOEs failed 
to produce an improvement in the performance of these firms. This was described as 
long-term causes that seen as a result of learning process (Ramamurti, 1991). For 
instance, the privatisation in Tunisia was the result of poor performance of many SOEs 
(Kauffmann & Wegner, 2007). The wide acceptance of privatisation in Latin America 
was a result of the recognition that the involvement of the state in economic activities 
failed to deliver the promised results (Ruiz-Mier, Garron, Machicado, & Capra, 2002). 
Thus, dissatisfactory with the performance of SOEs provides explanation for why some 
countries pursued privatisation. The following proposition is offered: 
P.4: The government privatise its economy due to the poor performance of the SOEs. 
It is quite clear from the literature that there are at least four explanations related to the 
privatisation trend. These explanations include 1) ideological shifts from the state 
towards private ownership, 2) high budget deficit, 3) pressures from international lending 
agencies, and 4) the poor performance of the SOEs. However, these explanations are not 
mutually exclusive; they could be operating simultaneously in any country. Some of them 
may even be causally connected. For instance, poor performance of SOEs (P-4) could 
contribute to high state budget deficits (P-2), which, in turn, could force countries to turn 
to the WB for funds (P-3). The changes in a country‟s ideology (P-1) may be the result of 
dissatisfaction with the country‟s economic performance (P-2) (Ramamurti, 1991). 
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3. Research Methodology   
3.1 A single country study  
The study concerns a single country as a case in order to obtain in-depth knowledge 
about economic reform and privatisation. Among many developing countries Libya is 
selected as case study for this paper as it is at turning point from a socialist and planned 
to a market-based economic system.  
3.2 Data sources and measures   
Data collection relies on documents and material from the General Board of Ownership 
Transfer (GBOT), IMF, and industrial information centre. The privatisation database 
published by the GBOT, which is a privatisation agency, reports a privatisation progress 
in terms of a number of privatised companies and the followed procedures. It also reveals 
a type of the new owners whether individual, employment, domestic, or foreign (Oswald 
& Jahera, 1991). In addition to the percentage of shares that remained with the state 
(Kocenda & Svejnar, 2003). Privatisation database also used to identify the political 
economy of privatisation that reveals the platform and ideological orientation of the 
government (Bortolotti, Fantini, & Siniscalco, 2003). The Country‟s Annual Reports 
(CARs) published by IMF from 2003 to 2008 report the economic development of the 
country and the progress of economic reform. They concern activities related to opening 
state monopolies, and the deregulating or liberalising the market. The CARs also reveal 
the prevalence of tariffs, exchange rate controls, balance of payments, and limitations on 
the imports and exports. The annual reports also reveal the relation between the Libyan 
government and the WB. The official government reports reveal the performance of 
public sector and therefore show how satisfied or dissatisfied the Libyan government is 
likely to be with the performance of its public sector. 
3.3 Data analysis  
For the analysis purpose, the paper specifies a set of theoretical propositions that are 
derived from the literature to answer the questions that are being asked in this paper (Yin, 
2003). Those propositions narrow down the focus of the paper and direct attention to four 
main causes of privatisation program. The propositions are also used as guiding tools for 
analysing the research findings. Two steps are followed to analyse the collected data. In 
the first step, a brief overview of the historical economic development in Libya is 
reviewed in order to understand the recent Libyan economic reform. In the second step 
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the theoretical propositions are compared with the empirical data to answer the questions. 
4. The Libyan economy an overview    
To interpret the recent Libyan economic reform, it is necessary to have an overview of 
the historical economic development in the country. By the time of independence 1951, 
Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world (Vandewalle, 1996). It was mainly 
based on agriculture and foreign aid from the UK, the US, the UN, the United Arab 
Republic (UAR) and Italy (El azzabi, 1974). In addition to revenues from the sale of 
scrap metal left behind by the belligerents during the war and rents from military bases 
used by the US and the UK (Vandewalle, 1996). The foreign aids and agriculture sector 
contributed about 26 percent of GDP each (Alfitouri, 2004). By the end of 1950s, after oil 
had been discovered and marketed, the economy of Libya has changed from one of the 
poorest countries to one of the richest economies (El azzabi, 1974). In 1963, for the first 
time the Libyan economy had achieved surplus in its balance of payments that reached 
LD35 million (Alfitouri, 2004). The national income increased by 344 percent from 
LD131 million in 1962 to LD789 million in 1968. It was due to the continuous increase 
of 835 percent in the oil exports during this period (El azzabi, 1974).  
The monarchy government, at that time, turned to use oil revenues as an engine for the 
economic growth. It advocated capitalist philosophy that limiting the role of the 
government and encouraging the private sector to develop both itself and the economy 
(Ghanem, 1985). Due to the small size of the domestic private sector, the majority of 
development projects were carried out by foreign private sector (Alfourjani, 2005). 
Unfortunately, very little is known about this period mainly due to the lack of literature. 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the oil sector developed rapidly and become the dominated 
sector of the economy. The economic development plan favoured people working in 
agriculture and oil sectors. The cities in the north, mainly Tripoli and Binghazi, benefited 
more from development allocations plan than the rest of the country (Ghanem, 1985). 
In 1969, the new revolutionary government transferred the economy from being 
capitalist-oriented to being socialist-oriented economy (Abdossalam, 1985). Although in 
the first few years of the revolution, there was a continuation of the previous economic 
policies and the private sector flourished even more than it had done before the revolution 
(Ghanem, 1985). In 1972 the private sector investment had risen to LD7.8 million (Allan, 
1982). In the mid-1970s, the government advocated socialist philosophy that expending 
public sector and cutting back the private sector (Ghanem, 1985). In the new economic 
system the private ownership was severely restricted as outlined in the Green Book. It 
was argued that unrestricted ownership would lead to exploitation through wages, rent 
and profit that would give rise to income disparity and inequality (Abdossalam, 1985). 
 7 
People were not allowed to own more than the house in which they lived and the rental 
payment for property was outlawed (Meliha, 1996). But small ventures could be carried 
out as long as they involved self-employment or family undertaking (Abdossalam, 1985).  
The principal vehicles for fostering economic transformation in this period have been two 
five-year plans (1976-80 and 1981-85) (Ghanem, 1985). Through these two plans, the 
total of LD 20.593 billion was allocated and total of LD 18.951 billion was actually spent 
on different economic sectors (The Ministry of Planning, 2002). Among other objectives, 
the plans were aimed to create diversified economic structure through investing in 
different economic sectors and thus, reduce the domination of oil sector (O‟heda, 2003). 
The plans were also aimed to reduce income disparities between people, regions, and 
sectors through expanding the role of public sector, progressive taxes, and distributing the 
service and production units over the country (Alqadhafi, 2002). 
Consequently, the government agencies and corporations were created to import and 
trade a wide range of goods and services (Abdossalam, 1985). The private sector was 
almost abolished through nationalisation process (Altrhouni, 2000). First foreign trade 
then local, both wholesale and retail, was nationalised. The workers, encouraged by the 
Green Book view of industrial ownership, took over the plants they working at, 
proclaimed themselves „partners not employees‟ (Ghanem, 1985). The braches of foreign 
banks, namely Barclays bank, D.C.O, Banco di Roma, Banco di Napoli, and the Arab 
Bank, were nationalised and became completely state-owned (Abdossalam, 1985). The 
state created 1279 centralised supermarkets in various parts of the country with the aim to 
provide the daily needs of Libyans (Ajam, Kilani, Frhat, Alarabi, & Rashid, 1984). The 
role of the government in economic activities was gradually increased and became 
directly responsible for all sectors of the economy and all aspect of social life. It directly 
employed about 75 percent of labour force (Vandewalle, 2006). The increasing income 
from oil eased to follow a policy of all things to all people (Ghanem, 1985).  
5. The Libyan economy reforms    
Due to the drop in the oil market, the Libyan oil revenues went down from $21 billion in 
1980 to $6.5 billion in 1986 (Vandewalle 1996). This loss of income adversely affected 
the state‟s ability to continue with its pervious policy (Ghanem, 1985). The state 
responded by applying austerity policy and limiting the list of imports by cutting 
unnecessary commodities. Despite these efforts, austerity policies did not help to save 
much money and the state had to reform its earlier economic policies (Meliha, 1996). 
After brief an overview of the Libyan economy, this section sheds light to the economic 
reform programs in Libya, particularly the privatisation as one element of the economic 
reform, from its commencement in 1987 to 2008 in three experiences as following:  
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5.1 The first economic reform program  
As result, the government introduced the concept of tashrukiyya, collective ownership 
that allowed for the creation of cooperatives to which some partners contribute labour 
and capital (Vandewalle, 1998). Between 1987 and 1989, the government passed a new 
collection of laws allowed, for the first time since 1977, limited private sector investment 
in Libya. The tashrukiyya system aimed to encourage the small-scale private sector to 
participate in retail trade, service and light industries as means of overcoming the 
inefficiency in these industries (Meliha, 1996). In industrial sector, for example, 102 
public firms had been turned over into tashrukiyya form and 10233 new private firms 
were established (the Ministry of Industry, 1992).  
According to the Ministry of Planning (2005), the success of the tashrukya system was 
limited as most of the firms that were privatised through this system suffered from 
performance decline, some even continued with loss-making. This was attributed to the 
privatisation procedure as these firms had not been restructured in way that ensures their 
performance improvement. They had been privatised with their prior debts and their 
labour force intact. Alqadhafi (2002) added that the government control and intervention 
in the economy remained widespread, which means the price-setting was still government 
control. So that it was difficult for these firms to make profit as in market economy.  
5.2 The second economic reform program  
In the early 1990s, Libya was not only suffering from the effects of international 
economic sanctions but a drop in oil prices was placing a huge strain on the Libyan 
state‟s ability to finance its inefficient public sector (Otman, 2007). To withstand this, the 
government went further and adopted its second economic reform program. It introduced 
the concept of sharika musahima, joint-stock company, which allowed private companies 
to open foreign currency accounts and to import equipment (Vandewalle, 1998). This was 
meant to surpass the previous privatisation experience and share the burden of public 
with the private sector via more reduction in the government‟s involvement in the 
economy. In this case, the central committee was established. It consisted of a secretary, 
chairman, and members, who were specialised and expert in their respective fields 
(Alakdar, 2005). In industrial sector, for example, 196 public firms were privatised and 
7483 new private firms were established (the Ministry of Industry, 1992).  
The Ministry of Planning (2005) reported that the performance of the privatised firms 
was declined and the production was similar to if not worse than before privatisation. The 
report provided the same reasons that mentioned for the first economic reform. Addition 
reason stated by Alqadhafi (2002), the privatisation method was partly responsible for 
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performance decline as it was limited only to employee buyouts. Alakdar (2005) 
concluded that, several privatised firms suffered from not only the expensive of sprat 
parts but also the difficulty to obtain them because of procedures imposed on the private 
sector. In addition to economic sanctions, a length procedure of licensing foreign 
investments led to only few foreign projects to invest in Libya (Otman, 2007). 
5.3 The recent economic reform program  
In 2003, the Libyan government prepared a large scale privatisation program, al tamleek. 
It is described as a program of broadening the ownership base through encouraging 
residents to own the public firms in order to avoid concentrated ownership (Alfourjani 
2005). Initially, the program targeted 360 public firms included 204 industrial firms, 56 
agricultural firms, 82 livestock firms, and 18 marine firms. These firms were planed for 
privatisation according to an interlocking time schedule in three stages during a period of 
2004 to 2008, (Aldroish, Khajiji, & Alkdar, 2005). This section discusses the recent 
economic reform program in the light of the theoretical propositions of the paper. 
The political economy of the privatisation  
The current privatisation is aimed to restructure the Libyan economy towards building 
poplar capitalism through spreading share ownership more widely (Alsouia, 2005). To 
this end, the employees and residents were encouraged through savings schemes to 
participate in owing the public sector firms. The foreigners were also allowed to 
participate but with limitation imposed on their ownership (the GBOT, 2004). The 
privatisation is part of large economic reform programs included the Wealth Distribution 
Program (WDP) that launched to distribute part of the oil wealth to the population (the 
GBOT, 2004). The distribution will be in the form of both cash and shares in the public 
firms to improve the living standards of residents. The initially announced amount was 
LD25-30 (about $20-25) billion, but subsequently only 4.6 (about $3.8) billion were 
approved in 2008 (IMF, 2008).  The current privatisation is aimed to reduce the public 
sector and enhance the role of private sector in the economy. So that to bring the country 
into the WTO membership (John, 2008). The current privatisation policy is aimed to 
improve the performance of public sector and national economy through attracting the 
private savings, and transferring the role of the government from the owner and manager 
to supporter and encourager of the economic activities (Shernna & Alfourjani, 2007).  
The performance of the Libyan economy  
Oil revenues in Libyan dinar were increased by the large devaluation of the official 
exchange rate at the beginning of 2002. However, tax and customs revenues declined, 
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mainly as result of widespread exemptions granted to public firms in 2002. As result, 
total revenues increased by only 2.5 percent of GDP. The CPI declined by 9.8 percent, 
driven mostly by increased competition resulting from trade liberalisation and 
exemptions from all taxes and customs duties granted to public firms. GDP stagnated in 
2002, reflecting 7.6 percent decline in oil production, and 2.9 percent growth in the non-
oil sector. The external account shifted to a deficit for the first time since 1998 as import 
payments rose by almost 40 percent to $7.4 billion, while export receipts fell by about 8 
percent, driven by a decline in oil exports. About 75 percent of these import are financed 
from the budget and the remaining imports are those of public firms which were provided 
foreign exchange at the pre-unification official rate at the end-2001, they also were 
exempted from tax and custom in 2002 (IMF, 2003).  
The government interference in the economy resulted in a continuous deterioration in the 
business climate, low economic growth, fragile macroeconomic conditions, and increased 
vulnerability to external shocks (IMF, 2006). This led the Libyan government to request 
technical assistance from the WB to reform and modernise its economy (IMF 2003). The 
staff from IMF stated that Libya needs strong and sustained economic growth to meet the 
demands of its rapidly growing labour force and an efficient use of the state‟s resources. 
This can only be achieved through the implementation of extensive market-oriented 
structural reforms that would enhance the role of the private sector and promote 
economic diversification (IMF, 2006). 
The role of the World Bank (WB) 
In 2002, technical assistance (TA) was signed between the WB and the Libyan 
government. Libya would have to cover most of the cost of the assistance. It was 
identified in the area of the monetary policy, bank restructuring, tax policy, and revenues 
management. The TA aim to consolidate public finance, streamline budgetary 
management, remove external trade restrictions, complete price liberalisation, rationalise 
the subsidy system, develop a vigorous privatisation program, and improve the business 
climate (IMF 2003). In 2005, medium term strategy (MTS) was signed between the WB 
and the Libyan government. It aims to maintain macroeconomic stability and rationalise 
the use of the country‟s oil wealth, accelerate the transition to a market economy, and 
create a solid basis for the development of the non-oil sectors. In 2007, a technical 
cooperation agreement was signed between the WB and the Libyan government with a 
total budget of $1 million contributed jointly in two parts. The agreement funds a joint 
economic advisory program, to support and further Libyan‟s reform process, covering the 
period of July 2007 to June 2008. Activities were launched in the areas of an investment 
climate assessment, business and legal environment, and support for the development of 
the Libyan vision 2025 (IMF, 2008).    
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The performance of the public sector 
The paper focuses on privatisation of the public industrial sector (PIS) because it was the 
first sector that exposed to the current privatisation program. Since 1969, the PIS 
received priority and huge amount of money to enhance the economic diversification by 
expanding the non-oil products. The government policies in the PIS also aimed to achieve 
more self reliance and self sufficiency in food. It is also aimed to contribute to regional 
development and job creation. Throughout the period of 1970 to 2005, about LD6 
(almost $5) billion was allocated in different development plans for the PIS and LD4 
(about $3.2) was actually spent on it (the Ministry of Electricity, Industry, & Minerals 
(MEIM), 2006). As result, the PIS rapidly grew as hundreds of industrial projects were 
established in different regions of the country (Ghanem, 1985). In 2001, it hired 172.1 
employees, account for 11.8 percent of total labour force (IMF, 2005).  
Despite the huge investments that are being poured into the PIS, the sector still relies 
heavily on oil revenues, especially in providing foreign currency, for both investment and 
raw inputs (the Ministry of Industry 2000). The contribution of the PIS to the GDP did 
not exceed 8 percent during 1970s, whereas it dropped to 5.9 percent in 2000 and 
eventually dropped again to 3.2 percent in 2002 (Shareia, 2006). According to the MEIM 
(2006), the LIS, like other sectors, suffered from reduction in the expenditure due to the 
drop in the oil market since mid-1980s. The PIS was also subjected to various 
organisation changes. In 2000, the Ministry of Industry was abolished and its competence 
was transferred to the production affairs at the government level. This resulted in 
administration instability, overlap in the authorities and responsibilities, which had 
negative impact about the performance of the sector (the MEIM, 2006).    
In addition, there were many low-performance industrial projects; some even resulted in 
financial losses (Alqadhafi, 2002). This is to some extent owing to the increased 
competition from private sector imports (IMF, 2005). Most of the industrial projects were 
equipped with absolute machinery due to the delay and cancel of the investment and 
development plans (the MEIM, 2006). The public industrial projects faced a sharp 
increase in the cost of their inputs due to the sudden unification of the exchange rate (the 
Ministry of Economy & Trade, 2006). 
The current status of the economic reform  
By the end of 2007, 57 headquarters, mother companies, were liquated through 
procedures of bankruptcy. These companies not only failed to realise their targets, but 
they were persistent loss makers, suffer from marketing, technology, cash and workforce 
problems. Another 80 public industrial firms were privatised buy using four different 
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privatisation methods. 31 industrial public firms were privatised through management 
and employee buyout, tashrukiyya form. 37 industrial public firms were privatised by 
using special bidding, sharika musahima. 10 industrial public firms were privatised 
through direct discussions with investment holding organisations. Two industrial public 
firms were privatised through partnership between the employees, domestic investment 
holding organisations, and public.  
Two new private commercial banks and one private regional bank were licensed in 2002. 
BNP Paribas acquired 19 percent of Sahara Bank in August 2007, with immediate 
management control and option to purchase additional shares of up to 51 percent within 
3-5 years. Wahda Bank was acquired by Arab Bank in February 2008 under similar terms 
(IMF, 2008). Some key strategic companies are still earmarked for privatisation, 
particularly Libyan airlines, public telecommunication company, Brega petroleum 
company, and electricity distribution network (Alfotesi, 2008). The stock exchange was 
established in 2006 and by end-2007, seven companies (mostly banks) were listed with a 
capitalisation of LD1.2 billion (IMF, 2008).  
Notable progress has been made on various structural reforms, tariff rates were reduced, 
resulting in a decline in the simple average tariff to 17.8 percent. So that to make it far 
easier for foreign investments and capital to enter the country (IMF, 2005). The trade 
regime was simplified by cutting half the consumption tax rate on imported goods (IMF 
2007). The state import monopolies were also reduced to petroleum products and 
weaponry. The list of prohibited import (40 items) was scaled down to less than ten 
products. The government intend to keep the import bans only for religious and health 
reasons (IMF 2007). So that private sector can freely import or produce goods that were 
previously under public monopoly (IMF, 2007). Numerous investment agreements with a 
number of countries have been signed so that to encourage foreign direct investment and 
harmonise taxes. Infrastructure is also being modernised and free zones are planned 
(IMF, 2003). Certification requirements for trade with Maghrep countries have also been 
simplified (IMF, 2008). 
6. Finding and Discussion  
To address the propositions of the paper, this section compares the findings with the 
theoretical propositions. From the overview of the historical economic development in 
Libya, that the Libyan nationalisation program, in the context of its time, was not unique. 
From the 1950s to 1970s, in line with a general anti-colonial backlash in plethora of 
newly independent nations, a series of major nationalisation programs took place in many 
Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Following these countries, many foreign-
owned resources were nationalised in Libya after the revolution in 1969. This change was 
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the result of ideological change, the desire, search for independence, and construction of 
the state. As defined by article 6 of the constitution declaration of 1969. The 
nationalisation program that took place through the 1970s was affected to reduce 
perceived social inequalities, effectively to return exploitative business, whether domestic 
or foreign, to the Libyan people. The role of the state in this operation was to act as a 
trustee of these nationalised and publicly owned firms, which in fact were ultimately 
owned by the people (Otman, 2007). 
The process of privatisation in Libya shares several similarities with what has been 
observed in the literature. The first wave of privatisation, which began in 1987, was 
response to the drop in the oil market prices. The drop in the oil market affected the 
country‟s ability to continue with its previous policy. As result the government adopted 
its first economic reform and allowed, for the first time since 1977, limited private sector 
investment in Libya. The second wave of privatisation, which began in 1992, provided 
political signal, notably regarding the international economic sanctions. It was also was 
response to the drop in the oil market prices in early 1990s and the poor financial 
performance of many public sector firms.  
P.1 Recently, the Libyan government seems to have accepted the view of economic 
efficiency of the private sector over the public sector. After evidence revealed that a 
variety of solutions to the problem of managing the public sector failed to produce an 
improvement in the performance of the public sector companies. As Colonel Alqathafi 
stated “this system has failed the same as happened in the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe because it depended on unqualified employees who do not care about 
their country’s interests. The economy has no place for sentiments and niceties and 
therefore, this sector have to be reviewed as there is no one understands it in Libya” 
(Arabic News, 2003). 
This is clearly reflected the end of the socialist period and shift the country towards 
market-oriented economy. Although, the government chooses the policy that maximises 
social welfare as it was reflected in the priorities that were given to the residents and the 
WDP program. A Colonel Alqadhafi himself stressed “the need to avoid capitalism and 
exploitation, in case the public sector is cancelled. He re-affirmed the need to establish 
people‟s socialism, or even people‟s capitalism” (Arabic News, 2003). The recent wave 
of privatisation seems to be a result of ideological shift away from the policy of the 
public sector.  However, it provides part of the explanation for why the government 
pursued privatisation in 2003. Therefore, the proposition 1 was partly accepted. 
P.2 Libyan economy in 2002 suffered few balance of payments problems, rapidly 
growing labour force, and inefficient use of the country‟s resources. It was impacted by 
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the unification of the exchange rate, liberalisation of the external sector, and 
accommodating fiscal and credit policies (IMF, 2003). Under these circumstances, 
privatisation in Libya is a strategy to correct the past policies of the costs and benefits of 
using the public sector. This was clearly evident by the staff from the IMF. They stated 
that Libya needs strong and sustained economic growth to meet the demands of its 
rapidly growing labour force and an efficient use of the country‟s resources. This can 
only be achieved through the implementation of far-reaching market-oriented structural 
reforms (IMF, 2006). This reveals that the recent wave of privatisation was desire to meet 
the demands of its rapidly growing labour force and an efficient use of the country‟s 
resources. Therefore, the proposition 2 was accepted 
P.3 The role of the WB group was limited to provide technical assistance and economic 
advisory program to reform and modernise its economy. Therefore, the privatisation in 
Libya is result of its own policy plan, rarely after pressure from the international 
agencies. This means the proposition 3 was rejected.  
P.4 After three decades of excessive reliance on the public sector, the government has 
become dissatisfied with the performance of the public firms and learned that the 
inefficiency associated with the public sector were higher than expected. This was clearly 
evident in the interposition made by Algathafi in the Libyan economic forum on the 
aversion of oil revenues in the future, when he said: The hundreds of factories that we 
have established in order to sell their products and bring the foreign currency necessary 
to buy the raw materials and provide maintenance and services for their machinery, we 
keep spending the revenues from oil on these enterprises thinking that they will replace 
the dependency on oil. Instead, they as well continue to rely on oil the agriculture 
activities came to a standstill and so did the industry cited by (Shareia, 2006). Therefore, 
dissatisfactory the performance of public sector can also explain the cause of the recent 
privatisation in Libya. This means the proposition 4 was accepted.  
7. Conclusions  
This paper explored the recent causes of the economic reform, especially privatisation, in 
Libya. It found that Libya differences from other developing countries that have been 
embarked on privatisation in response to pressures from international agencies. It has 
pursued on privatisation as result of its own policy plan to correct the past policies of the 
public sector. The privatisation of what perceived as strategic companies and the 
establishment of the Libyan stock market is clearly reflected the shift of the government 
ideology towards market-oriented economy.  The government, however, chooses a policy 
that maximizes social welfare as reflected in the employee ownership and the Wealth 
Distribution Program. This indicates that privatisation in Libya based on empirical 
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evidence of the poor performance of the SOEs, rather than on hope and theory as in the 
UK and France. This leads to the conclusion that privatisation has been pursued in Libya 
with more pragmatic and less ideological base.  
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